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6 The Evolution of International
Humanitarian Law
DARRYL R O B I N S O N
AND VALERIE OOSTERVELD
International humanitarian law (IHL) is primarily directed at promot-
ing humane standards of behaviour in situations of armed conflict, a
time when human security is most at risk. IHL consists of numerous
rules and principles governing parties to armed conflict, requiring, for
example, that combatants distinguish between military and civilian tar-
gets; that civilians not be the deliberate target of operations; and that
methods of warfare causing unnecessary suffering be avoided. It also
contains detailed rules requiring that civilians, prisoners of war, and
the sick and wounded within a party's power be treated humanely.
The context in which IHL must be applied is changing dramatically.
There has been a marked rise in violent internal armed conflicts - wars
fought between factions entirely within a state's borders. In these new
conflicts, civilians are increasingly in the line of fire or even deliber-
ately targeted for appalling violence. IHL has correspondingly evolved
and adapted to a changing world, both in response to the altered
nature of conflict, and also due to the emergence of a people-centred
approach to security.
While this area of international law has traditionally developed slowly
and incrementally, in the last decade it has undergone revolutionary
change. IHL has been invigorated by a synergy between the ground-
breaking jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the development of the
International Criminal Court (ice) Statute, and national initatives. IHL
has entered into an unprecedented period in which texts from only a
few years ago have already been overtaken by developments. Thus, it has
been observed that IHL as a body of law has recently "come of age."1
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Nevertheless, while important gains have clearly been made, there
still remains considerable resistance to developments in this area, as
many states remain very hesitant about IHL. The traditional concern is
that IHL should not become a means of interfering with national sov-
ereignty, a concern that has increased because so many conflicts are
now internal. This concern has been manifested in resistance not only
to the development of new principles or rules, but even to modest
commitments to promote compliance, such as providing access to
monitors or providing information on national IHL activities. In addi-
tion, military powers and states engaged in conflict have sought to
preserve a great deal of flexibility in their military practices.
Even more problematically, actual compliance with IHL in many of
today's conflicts is abysmal, with massive violations of even the most ba-
sic rules being commonplace. The problems of enforcement and the
means of promoting compliance will, therefore, also be discussed
below.
E X P A N D I N G T H E R E A C H
O F H U M A N I T A R I A N L A W
IHL has been around for quite some time, reflected both in customary
law and in important treaties such as the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Additional Proto-
cols thereto of 1977. The resulting body of law has been valuable in
promoting humane standards of behaviour, but it focuses on a classical
concept of international armed conflict, namely conflict between regu-
lar armed forces of different states. The greatest challenge for human
security today is the regulation of noninternational, or internal, armed
conflicts.
In contrast to international armed conflicts, where states have per-
ceived a reciprocity of interest in establishing basic rules, internal
armed conflicts have often been regarded as a matter for domestic dis-
cretion, providing governments with the maximum latitude in fighting
rebels. Many states have been more inclined to look after their own in-
terests than community concerns or humanitarian demands. Obtain-
ing any acknowledgement at all of rules applicable in internal armed
conflict has, therefore, been a slow and difficult struggle. Even where
treaty provisions provided some grudging recognition of the most ele-
mentary rules applicable in internal armed conflict, these provisions
did not provide for individual criminal responsibility for serious viola-
tions.2 At the start of the 19908, it was still received wisdom that viola-
tions in internal armed conflicts were not "war crimes," i.e. that they
did not give rise to criminal liability.
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The recent recognition of the concept of war crimes in internal
armed conflicts is one of the most profound but least heralded results
of the ascendency of human security as an international priority. Over
the last few years, several developments have prompted the interna-
tional community to insist that vital humanitarian concerns not be
overshadowed by narrow sovereignty concerns. The increasing preva-
lence, scale, and cruelty of internal armed conflicts effectively de-
manded a response if IHL is to remain relevant in today's world.
Internal armed conflicts have not only eclipsed international conflicts
in number, but they have also given rise to the most shocking atroci-
ties, with civilians being terrorized and persecuted by reason of their
race or ethnicity. At the same time, many states have become more will-
ing to focus on the security of individual human beings, and to take
firmer steps to promote basic standards of decency. The work of the ad
hoc tribunals has also accelerated developments, by interpreting and
applying IHL and breathing life into these doctrines.
The adoption by the Security Council of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which recognized juris-
diction over war crimes in internal armed conflicts, was a major step
forward. The jurisprudence subsequent to the creation of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) contin-
ued this momentum, holding that the most well-established
prohibitions from international armed conflicts might now be re-
garded as applicable in internal conflicts. This process of extension
was continued with the adoption of the ice Statute. Despite initial
opposition from a determined minority of states, Canada and other
like-minded states insisted on recognition of war crimes in internal
armed conflicts.3 In the result, the ice Statute recognizes a signifi-
cant list of well-established prohibitions from international armed
conflict as also being applicable in noninternational armed conflicts.
This process of "blurring" the legal differences between interna-
tional and internal armed conflict must continue, as there is still a gap
in the extent of regulation of the two types of conflict. The different
treatment is the product of the historical development of this area of
law, but there is no compelling moral reason for the distinction to re-
main as extensive as it is. Future efforts of the international community
will likely be aimed at further narrowing these differences, and a study
of customary international law by the International Committee of the
Red Cross, expected to be completed in the near future, may help ad-
vance this process. At present, however, resistance from cautious states
remains strong.
Another important development in recent years is the clear affir-
mation that crimes against humanity are punishable not only when
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committed in armed conflict, but also during internal disturbances
or peacetime. This issue was still being debated only a few years ago,
and indeed the ICTY Statute adopted in 1993 restricted its jurisdic-
tion over crimes against humanity to those committed during an
armed conflict. Only one year later, however, the ICTR Statute was
adopted, recognizing crimes against humanity without any such re-
striction. Jurisprudence of the ICTY has affirmed that crimes against
humanity can occur even in the absence of armed conflict. This issue
was hotly contested during the ice negotiations, but eventually
agreement was reached on a Canadian-proposed definition of crimes
against humanity, affirming that there is no requirement of armed
conflict.
Other steps are being taken to expand the scope of IHL to apply to
more people in more situations. In 1999, on the fiftieth anniversary of
the Geneva Conventions, the UN secretary-general announced that
United Nation's (UN) forces engaged as combatants would be bound
by fundamental rules of international humanitarian law,4 removing
any ambiguity over the legal nature and status of UN forces under UN
command. The ice Statute, adopted in 1998, affirmed that the princi-
ple of command responsibility includes not only military commanders
but also civilian leaders and other persons in authority. The definitions
of crimes in the ice Statute, and in particular the definition of crimes
against humanity, clearly encompass nonstate actors. Moreover, discus-
sions are underway to identify any possible remaining gaps in human
rights and humanitarian law protection and to identify "fundamental
standards of humanity" applicable in all situations - including internal
violence, disturbances, tensions, and public emergency - from which
no derogation is permitted. These discussions have highlighted the in-
terplay between IHL and international human rights law and the grad-
ual process of cross-fertilization and convergence between these
bodies of law.
B U I L D I N G N E W N O R M S :
P R O T E C T I N G T H E V U L N E R A B L E
As has been graphically demonstrated in recent conflicts, civilians are
not only suffering as a result of armed conflict, but they also have be-
come the deliberate targets of war. The last decade has seen consider-
able advances in responding to the specific problems of vulnerable
groups, which had not been adequately addressed under previously
existing general rules.
For example, women have been particularly targeted for rape and
other forms of sexual violence by combatants as a form of intimidation
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and torture, and as a means of terrorizing a population. In the last de-
cade, important strides have been taken to overcome the traditional
hesitance to recognize and deal with such atrocities. A 1992 report by
a commission of experts appointed to investigate war crimes in the
former Yugoslavia was precedent-setting. It not only investigated and
documented accounts of rape and other forms of sexual violence, but
it analyzed evidence pointing to a policy of rape. Rape was recognized
as a crime against humanity in the ICTY Statute and then identified
both as a crime against humanity and as a war crime in the ICTR Stat-
ute. In 1998, Canada was instrumental in ensuring the inclusion of a
detailed list of sexual and gender-based crimes in the ice Statute, in-
cluding not only rape but also sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and persecution on the basis
of gender.
Children are especially vulnerable during armed conflict. They are
recruited as under-age soldiers, or are murdered because they might
be so recruited. Children are forced into sexual and domestic slavery,
and are used as human shields. Increasing recognition of the effects of
war on children has led to several important initiatives. In 1998, the
ice Statute was adopted, recognizing as a war crime the conscription
or enlistment of children under the age of fifteen years into armed
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities. On 21 January
2000, a draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict was concluded,
raising the minimum age levels - the age of conscription at eighteen,
voluntary recruitment above fifteen, and the use of children in conflict
situations at eighteen.
UN personnel and humanitarian aid workers are another group
that is frequently-targeted, often as part of a deliberate effort to un-
dermine peacebuilding efforts. The international community has
taken some steps to respond to this problem, for example, by adopt-
ing the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel,
which provides protection in certain operations for UN personnel and
persons deployed by humanitarian nongovernmental organizations
under agreement with the UN. Further measures to protect humani-
tarian aid workers are necessary, in order to broaden the protective
coverage for both UN and non-UN humanitarian personnel, including
locally-engaged staff.
Recent initiatives to ban or otherwise limit certain weapons are an-
other essential means to protect civilians and promote human security.
The Ottawa Convention prohibiting antipersonnel mines is an obvious
example. A new challenge is to address the proliferation of small arms
and light weapons, especially because of the clear link with child
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soldiers: as weapons become smaller and lighter, ever younger chil-
dren are being recruited and conscripted to fight. The UN is currently
holding a series of preparatory meetings on small arms and light
weapons, culminating in an international conference in 2001.
Not only are civilians extremely vulnerable in armed conflict situa-
tions, but civilian property is as well. In 1999, a Second Protocol to the
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict was adopted. Building on the ice Statute,
the Second Protocol specifically defines serious violations which result in
individual criminal responsibility, such as theft, pillage or misappropria-
tion of protected cultural property, whether occurring in international
or internal armed conflict.
P R O M O T I N G C O M P L I A N C E
As the previous sections have indicated, the building of new norms in
IHL - both to enhance protection of vulnerable groups and to expand
the reach of IHL - has been and continues to be a vital endeavour. But
the critical failure, and therefore the critical front for progress, has
been the implementation of those norms.
Several factors, flowing from the changed nature of armed conflict,
have exacerbated this breakdown in compliance. In traditional state-
to-state conflict, which involved professional armies under military dis-
cipline, adherence to IHL (and particularly the distinction between
military and civilian targets) was consistent with the prevailing military
logic. However, the new circumstances of today's conflicts commonly
feature failed or failing states and bitter internecine struggles. Fighting
is carried out by insurgent groups with weak chains of command, inef-
fective military discipline, and minimal awareness of or interest in IHL.
Moreover, civilians are commonly perceived as primary targets,
whether for reasons of ethnic hatred or in order to spread terror. In
such circumstances, the application of IHL is under even greater strain
than in traditional interstate conflict situations. Thus, even as the
norms have grown stronger, actual compliance has become weaker.
Media reports on any particular day attest to persistent and massive vi-
olations of even the most basic rules. Promoting compliance is literally
a matter of life and death.
One method of promoting compliance, in which there has been
some progress, is the effort to ensure that violators will be held ac-
countable for their actions. The ad hoc tribunals created by the Secu-
rity Council for the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994)
were an important innovation in dealing with those who commit the
most serious violations of IHL.
167 International Humanitarian Law
The creation of these tribunals initially met with considerable pessi-
mism and cynicism about their potential impact. Some feared that the
pursuit of war criminals could hamper peace efforts; others were confi-
dent that the tribunals would never get the support necessary to appre-
hend and prosecute perpetrators. Even the strongest supporters had
cautious expectations. However, the tribunals have garnered the inter-
national support necessary to ensure the arrest and surrender of many
suspects. They have completed important cases and have issued
groundbreaking decisions on IHL and international criminal law issues
not addressed since Nuremberg. The tribunals also have demonstrated
that international criminal justice can be a reality, and that it will not
interfere with peace efforts. In fact, the work of the tribunals has been
helpful in isolating extremists and preventing historic revisionism,
thus facilitating real and lasting peace.
W A R C R I M E S T R I B U N A L S
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have had very
different experiences in gaining custody of indictees. When Louise Arbour
assumed the post of chief prosecutor in 1996, there were few accused in the
ICTY'S detention unit, and few prospects for more. Arbour successfully
pressed the international community, including the United Nations (UN)
Stabilization Force (SFOR), to arrest accused individuals. Arrests by SFOR in
1997 triggered voluntary surrenders, and since that time a steady stream of
indictees has been transferred to the ICTY. While the most senior leaders
(such as Milosevic, Karadzic, and Mladic) are still at large due to lack of
cooperation from certain countries such as the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the number of senior officials in custody has risen dramatically.
Since its creation, the ICTR has enjoyed greater success in obtaining
custody over high-ranking leaders indicted for the most serious crimes.
Many of the top officials involved in the genocide fled to other African
countries, as well as elsewhere. These accused have been transferred to the
ICTR from states such as Cameroon, Kenya, England, France, Denmark,
Belgium, and the United States. The tribunal now has the vast majority of
its publicly-indicted accused in custody.
It is very important that both the ICTY and the ICTR prosecute high-
placed individuals to demonstrate that the murders, rapes, and other
serious crimes could not have taken place on the scale and with the ferocity
that they did without support and guidance from the very top of the
command structure.
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The success of the tribunals has given impetus to the creation of a
permanent ice, which will serve a similar function but on a standing
basis. The statute of the ice was adopted in July 1998 and will enter
into force once sixty states ratify it. The work of the tribunals and the
efforts to create an ice have already helped generate a global "expec-
tation of justice." The willingness of the international community to es-
tablish international proceedings in response to serious violations of
humanitarian law has prompted national systems to take more seri-
ously their primary obligation to deal with these crimes within their
jurisdiction. This expectation of justice has also led to concrete steps to
establish accountability in situations as diverse as Cambodia, Sierra
Leone, and East Timor.
Although it is hoped that criminal investigation and prosecution of
the most serious violations will ultimately have a significant deterrent
effect, this will only occur once there is greater consistency and imme-
diacy in the application of criminal justice. Moreover, it cannot be a
complete solution, as respect for IHL will ultimately depend on its ac-
ceptance by combatants. Thus, many other means must be employed
to promote compliance with IHL. These include ratification, imple-
mentation, and dissemination of IHL instruments; training and educa-
tion of military personnel and other potential combatants and
fostering of cultures of military discipline; enhanced humanitarian ac-
cess to populations in need; and greater scrutiny and monitoring of
conduct, including thorough fact-finding missions. Political and pub-
lic vigilance is also indispensible to ensure that violations are de-
nounced and that pressure is brought to promote compliance. It is
only through a variety of such means that greater compliance with IHL
will be reached.
Great strides have been made in expanding the reach of IHL, build-
ing new norms to protect the vulnerable, and enforcing the norms of
IHL, but much work remains to be done. The evolution of IHL is of piv-
otal importance in protecting human security, since that security is so
often torn away in times of conflict. At the same time, however, efforts
to advance IHL cannot take place in a vacuum. They must complement
a variety of other measures to protect human security, such as preven-
tative action, conflict management, and measures addressing the root
causes of conflict. Indeed, we must recognize that creating conditions
where IHL is respected is a distant second choice to creating condi-
tions where IHL is not needed at all. Wherever conflicts erupt, how-
ever, the application of IHL will remain a critical humanitarian
imperative. We must, therefore, work to bolster compliance with IHL
and to ensure its continued relevance in today's armed conflicts.
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